How To Save American Democracy

 Complete report

This report identifies three major hazards to fair elections:

Partisan officials could refuse to certify the results of an election, as Michigan's most populous country nearly did after the 2020 election Election administrators, poll workers or poll watchers could prevent voters from casting ballots or keep votes from being counted Congress could refuse to certify the Electoral College results, as 147 Republicans voted to do last year

In the aftermath of the 2020 presidential election, a relatively small number of mostly Republican officials protected the United States from a major political crisis.

In Michigan, for example, State Election Board member Aaron Van Langevelde cast the pivotal vote to certify the results of the election, despite pressure to flout state law and delay certification.1 In Georgia, Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger refused to tamper with the results of the election, despite a lengthy call from President Donald Trump and his advisers in which Raffensperger was asked to “find 11,780 votes.”2 All told, at least 31 Republican elected officials from battleground states spoke to then-President Trump soon after the election—and though they tried to placate him, most were unwilling to go along with his schemes to change the results of the election.3

America may not be so lucky next time around.

Van Langevelde was not re-nominated for his board position, and Raffensperger was censured by the Georgia Republican Party4 and removed from his position as chair of Georgia’s State Election Board. Across the country, many Trump-aligned officeholders increasingly support and promote the idea that the presidential election was stolen; in fact, it has become “a new kind of litmus test.”5 It has been reported that more than 230 candidates running for Congress have embraced President Trump’s false claim that the election was stolen.6 Perhaps even worse, many of the candidates who are running to serve as top election officials in battleground states also support that false claim.

n other words, the people who stopped an overthrow of the last presidential election may not be there to defend U.S. democracy in 2024 and beyond.

This may not be a problem if one candidate wins the next election in a landslide or even by a decisive margin. But the recent trend has been the opposite: Americans are relatively evenly divided between the two major political parties, which means that electoral manipulation can succeed even if it only shifts a tiny percentage of the votes. In the 2020 election, then-presidential candidate Joe Biden’s margin of victory was less than 1 percent in three states: Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin.7 In that environment, even a relatively limited, poorly executed attempt to manipulate the election could succeed in changing the outcome.

The top threats to American elections and how to address them

This issue brief aims to clarify how future elections are threatened and how public policy can address those threats. But it is important to clarify at the outset: There is no silver bullet. A large segment of the American public has decided they do not trust the electoral system—at least not when their favored candidate loses. Changing those hearts and minds is a long-term challenge that is going to require thoughtful, long-term solutions.

In the meantime, however, policymakers ignore the short-term problem at their peril. Election officials might refuse to certify the next election. Bad actors might try to tamper with the results of the election—or prevent their opposition from voting—under the pretense of preventing fraud. And, even when the election is over and done, members of Congress might refuse to respect the Electoral College results.

This issue brief explores each of these threats  along with the ways that public policy can address them. Legislation alone is not going to restore faith in democracy, but it can strengthen the guardrails that—at least in the short run—keep democracy intact.